

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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O R 300209Z APR 76

FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7195

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE

AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 1838

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN

SUBJ: KOREA AT 31ST UNGA - CORE GROUP MEETING APRIL 28

REF: (A) USUN 1777; (B) STATE 098185; (C) USUN 1350

1. SUMMARY: (A) AT CORE GROUP MEETING APRIL 28, ALL MEMBERS REPRESENTED EXCEPT COSTA RICA. CORE GROUP MEMBERS REPORTED ON LOW-KEY, NEW YORK SOUNDINGS OF "GROUP OF 13" (REF A, PARA 3). THESE DISCLOSED NO PLANNING OR CONSULTATION UNDERWAY AMONG "13". THEY INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT MEMBERS OF "13" WILLING TO BE HELPFUL. ADDITIONALLY, MEMBERS OF "13" APPEARED APPRECIATE EARLY APPROACH. SOUNDINGS REFLECTED VIEWS THAT NORTH KOREANS BENT ON HAVING THEIR RESOLUTION, ALBEIT ONE POSSIBLY LIMITED TO CALL FOR REMOVAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM ROK.

(B) CORE GROUP MEMBERS ALSO CONFIRMED DURING DAY OF CONFIDENTIAL

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APRIL 28 THAT INSTRUCTIONS HAD GONE FORWARD FROM THEIR CAPITALS TO POSTS IN FIELD REGARDING APPROACHES TO NON-ALIGNED.

(C) CORE GROUP RECONFIRMED DESIRABILITY OF COMPLEMENTING APPROACHES IN NONALIGNED CAPITALS WITH APPROACHES TO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK (REF B PARA 8C). CORE GROUP CONSIDERED THAT APPROACHES IN NEW YORK SHOULD FOLLOW THOSE IN CAPITALS.

(D) CORE GROUP ALSO EXCHANGED STILL NECESSARILY FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION ON COMPOSITION OF 31ST UNGA'S GENERAL COMMITTEE.

(E) IN VERY GENERAL TERMS, ROK CHAIRMAN RAISED POSSIBILITY OF "STATEMENT OF APPEAL" ON KOREA BY NEUTRALS (REF A, PARA 5). CORE GROUP CONSIDERED THAT THIS OPTION MIGHT APPROPRIATELY BE INCLUDED WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF OPTION 5 "INTRODUCTION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION BY OTHERS" AGREED AT MARCH 29-30 CORE GROUP MEETINGS(REF C, PARA 6).

(F) CORE GROUP DECIDED TO MEET AGAIN ON MAY 5 AT 10:00 AM. AT WHICH TIME CONSIDERATION OF ACTION OPTIONS AGREED MARCH 29-30 WOULD BEGIN. (HOPEFULLY IN LIGHT OF SOME RETURNS REGARDING APPROACHES IN NONALIGNED CAPITALS.) OPTIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ORDER OF MARCH 29-30 LISTING:

(I) DELETION OF HOSTILE ITEM BY GENERAL COMMITTEE.

(II) GOOD OFFICES OF SECRETARY GENERAL TO PUT OFF DEBATE.

(III) DISASSOCIATION BY ROK FROM KOREAN DEBATE AT UNGA.

(IV) INTRODUCTION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION BY OUR SIDE.

(V) INTRODUCTION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION BY OTHERS (ASEANS'S, NORDICS, NON-ALIGNED, ETC.)

(VI) INTRODUCTION OF AMENDMENTS TO HOSTIL RESOLUTION BY OUR SIDE.

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(VII) INTRODUCTION OF AMENDMENTS TO HOSTIL RESOLUTION BY OTHERS. END SUMMARY.

2. SOUNDINGS OF "GROUP OF 13":

(A) SINGAPORE (UK): AMBASSADOR KOH OF SINGAPORE THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE A PRO-NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION JUST CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH KOREA OF FOREIGN TROOPS AS A WHOLE. SINCE NORTH KOREA HAD BEEN SO NEGATIVE TO "GROUP OF 13" INITIATIVES TOWARD COMPROMISE IN 1975, KOH'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT "13" WOULD BE UNABLE TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN 1976. IN PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, KOH BELIEVED THAT "13" WOULD BE DISPOSED TO HELP IF THEY PERCEIVED A

POSSIBLE USEFUL ROLE. KOH SAID HE WOULD MAKE A POINT SEEING THE NORTH KOREANS WITH A VIEW TO SOUNDING THEM OUT FURTHER REGARDING THEIR PLANS. KOH ADDED THAT SINGAPORE GAINED IMPRESSION DURING ROK FOREIGN MINISTER PARK'S VISIT THERE THAT ROK WANTED NO DEBATE. THEREFORE, SINGAPORE FELT ROK NOT INTERESTED IN STIMULATING ACTIVITY.

(B) INDONESIA (JAPAN): ALTHOUGH INDONESIAN MISOFFS WERE VAGUE AS TO SPECIFICS, THEY APPEARED VERY WILLING TO BE HELPFUL. ACCORDING TO JAPANESE, INDONESIANS ARE HIGHLY DISPLEASED WITH NORTH KOREANS BECAUSE PYONGYANG RECENTLY ACCORDED RED CARPET RECEPTION TO DELEGATION FROM FRETILIN (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF EAST TIMOR). INDONESIANS HAVE IN MIND, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN ROK FOREIGN MINISTER PARK VISITED JAKARTA, HE STRESSED ROK DESIRE TO AVOID DEBATE THIS YEAR. FOR THIS REASON, INDONESIANS THOUGHT IT BETTER TO KEEP A LOW PROFILE. SINCE INDONESIANS WOULD WANT TO ACT IN CONCERT WITH OTHER ASEANS'S THEY WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT MALAYSIA'S ATTITUDE. INDONESIANS TOLD JAPANESE, THAT MALAYSIA WOULD REQUIRE APPROVAL FROM BOTH SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA BEFORE ACTING ON KOREA. ACCORDING TO INDONESIANS, OTHER ASEAN'S DO NOT MAKE NORTH KOREAN APPROVAL A CONDITION. INDONESIANS FELT THAT MALAYSIA WOULD NEED TO BE PERSUADED AT KUALA LUMPUR TO DROP THIS CONDITION. JAPAN EXPRESSED VIEW THAT IT NOT BEYOND REALM OF POSSIBLE TO CHANGE MALAYSIA'S POSITION. NEW ZEALAND VOLUNTEERED THAT MALAYSIAN ATTITUDE COLORED BY MALAYSIA'S ESTIMATE OF RELATIVE CONFIDENTIAL

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SERIOUSNESS OF MALAYSIAN AND KOREAN SITUATIONS. MALAYSIA HAS AN ACTUAL INSURGENCY, SOUTH KOREA DOES NOT.

(C) MALAYSIA (NETHERLANDS): MALAYSIA'S CHARGE SINGH TOLD DUTCH THAT ANNOTATION OF NONALIGNED DRAFT AGENDA FOR COLOMBO ON KOREAN ITEM WAS "RELATIVELY" STIFF ONE. SINGH SAID NORTH KOREANS VERY ACTIVE AND WANT TO BE NAMED AT COLOMBO TO COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF NONALIGNED COUNTRIES. SINGH THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RESIST NORTH KOREANS WITHIN NONALIGNED GROUP. SINGH PREDICTED THAT MALAYSIA WOULD EXPRESS RESERVATIONS REGARDING ANY ACTION TAKEN AT COLOMBO ON KOREA BECAUSE SOUTH KOREA WAS NOT BEING HEARD THERE. SINGH SAID THE ASEAN'S WERE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS ON KOREA. HE ADDED, THOUGH, THAT ASEAN'S WILL NOT PLAY A ROLE ON KOREA IF THIS ROLE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. SINGH SAID THAT AS LONG AS THE NORTH KOREANS ARE ABLE TO PLAY OFF RUSSIANS AGAINST CHINESE THEY WILL GET BACKING IN U.N. SINGH WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC OVER POSSIBILITIES FOR AVOIDING UNGA DEBATE ON KOREA.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 1838

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(D) PHILIPPINES (ROK): ROK AMBASSADOR MOON HAD PAID COURTESY CALL ON PHILIPPINE AMBASSADOR REYES. REYES HAD ACCORDED CORE GROUP TALKING POINTS (REF B, PARA 4) SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE. REYES FELT THAT NEUTRAL NATIONS SHOULD PLAY A ROLE ON KOREA. REYES HAD INDICATED POSSIBILITY OF PHILIPPINE SUPPORT FOR WHAT HE TERMED "JAPANESE INITIATIVE". JAPANESE MISOFF AT CORE GROUP MEETING PROMISED TO CHECK INTO NATURE OF "JAPANESE INITIATIVE" TO WHICH REYES REFERRED.

(E) THAILAND (ROK) - AMBASSADOR MOON ALSO PAID COURTESY CALL ON THAILAND'S AMBASSADOR GUNA-KASEM WHOSE REMARKS ON KOREA WERE MOST SIMILAR TO THOSE OF AMBASSADOR REYES OF PHILIPPINES. GUNA-KASEM ALSO REFLECTED INTEREST IN "JAPANESE INITIATIVE".

(F) SWEDEN (NEW ZEALAND) -- NEW ZEALAND HAD TALKED WITH SWEDEN'S MINISTER HAMMARSKJOLD WHO SAID SWEDEN HAS NO IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO BREAK OUT OF KOREAN "IMPASSE". HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT SWEDEN COULD AGREE 100 PERCENT WITH OUR TALKING POINTS BUT CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT SWEDEN HAD DETECTED NO FLEXIBILITY IN NORTH KOREA'S POSITION. ACCORDING TO HAMMARSKJOLD, NORTH KOREANS SHOW NO CONCERN OVER POSSIBILITY OF CONFRONTATION AND THEY ARE CONFIDENT THEY WILL GET A RESOLUTION THROUGH BY A GREATER MARGIN THAN IN 1975. HAMMARSKJOLD STRESSED THAT NORTH KOREANS JUST WANT A PROPAGANDA VICTORY. HE SAID IT BECOMING INCREASINGLY

CLEAR THAT HOSTIL RESOLUTION WILL BE TABLED. ACCORDING TO HAMMARSKJOLD, SWEDEN REMAINS AS ANXIOUS AS EVER TO FIND A WAY OUT.

(G) NORWAY (CANADA) - NORWEGIAN MISOFF LINDSTROM, RESPONSIBLE FOR KOREAN ITEM, EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT CORE GROUP APPROACHES TO NONALIGNED WERE MOST USEFUL. LINDSTROM CONSIDERED IT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO HAVE FRIENDS OF SOUTH KOREA STAND UP AND HE COUNTED IN NONALIGNED CONTEXT. NONALIGNED MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO SWALLOW NORTH KOREAN STORY HOOK, LINE, AND SINKER. IN 1975, SWEDEN AND NORWAY HAD BEEN MOST ANXIOUS TO PURSUE CONSENSUS STATEMENT. LINDSTROM CHARGED, HOWEVER, THAT ASEAN'S IN "GROUP OF 13" HAD "LACKED BACKBONE". LINDSTROM FORESAW KOREAN DEBATE AGAIN IN 1976. HE THOUGHT OUR TALKING POINTS UNDERLINED WEAK POINTS IN 1975 HOSTILE RESOLUTION.

(H) AUSTRIA (FRG) - FRG REPORTED THAT AUSTRIANS SEEMED INTERESTED IN HEARING FROM CORE GROUP. THE AUSTRIANS SAID THEY WISHED THEY HAD SOME IDEAS BUT THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY. THEY LIKED OUR TALKING POINTS AND WANTED TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE.

(I) DENMARK (US) - DANISH MISOFF MARCUS HAD BEEN INTERESTED IN AND APPRECIATIVE OF OUR APPROACH ON KOREA. MARCUS, HOWEVER, HAD KNEW OF NO ACTIVITY ON PART OF "GROUP OF 13". SHE CONSIDERED "13" MORIBUND, FOR TIME BEING AT LEAST. MARCUS INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO BE HELPFUL. WE ADDED TO CORE GROUP THAT IN BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR INGVARSSON OF ICELAND. INGVARSSON STRESSED THAT NORTH KOREAN INTRANSIGENCE IN 1975 HAD DISCOURAGED "GROUP OF 13".

(J) TUNISIA (BELGIUM) - BELGIUM'S AMBASSADOR LONGERSTAEY HAD NOT YET REACHED AMBASSADOR DRISS OF TUNISIA WHO HAS BEEN MUCH OCCUPIED WITH LAW OF SEA CONFERENCE AND OTHER MATTERS. LONGERSTAEY EXPECTED TO MEET DRISS SOON.

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3. JAPAN VOLUNTEERED THAT PRIORITY FOR A FRIENDLY ITEM AND RESOLUTION COULD PROVE IMPORTANT IN 1976. US AGREED THAT PRIORITY COULD INDEED PROVE IMPORTANT. IN THIS CONNECTION, EVALUATION OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED DURING APPROACHES IN NONALIGNED CAPITALS WOULD BE VALUABLE. ACCORDINGLY, WE STRESSED DESIRABILITY THAT CORE GROUP APPROACHES IN CAPITALS BE MADE ON TIMELY BASIS. WE REPORTED THAT OUR INSTRUCTIONS TO POSTS ABROAD HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED BY DEPARTMENT ON APRIL 22. ALL DELEGATIONS PRESENT WITH EXCEPTION OF UK AND CANADA CONFIRMED THAT THEIR HEADQUARTERS HAD SENT INSTRUCTIONS. UK AND CANADA CHECKED SUBSEQUENTLY WITH HEADQUARTERS AND WERE ABLE TO REPORT LATE ON APRIL 28 THAT INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN SENT. ROK (CHAIRMAN) CONFIRMED AFTER MEETING THAT COSTA RICANS TOO HAD SENT INSTRUCTIONS.

4. U.S. ALSO RAISED DESIRABILITY OF COMPLEMENTING APPROACHES IN NONALIGNED CAPITALS WITH APPROACHES TO NON-ALIGNED REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK. CORE GROUP AGREED AND CONSIDERED THAT APPROACHES IN NEW YORK SHOULD FOLLOW THOSE IN CAPITALS.

5. ROK SAID THAT AS FOLLOW-ON TO "GROUP OF 13'S" ABANDONED PLAN TO MAKE "STATEMENT OF APPEAL" DURING 1975 UNGA PLENARY CONSIDERATION OF KOREAN QUESTION, ROK HAD BEEN CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF ENCOURAGING NEUTRALS TO MAKE "STATEMENT OF APPEAL" IN ADVANCE OF 31ST UNGA. NEW ZEALAND, UK AND OTHERS SPOKE UP TO SAY THAT THIS WAS WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION BUT ITS DISCUSSION WOULD APPROPRIATELY FALL UNDER ITEM V ON LIST OF OPTIONS (SEE ABOVE UNDER PARA 1 (F)). CORE GROUP AGREED ON THIS.

6. ROK RAISED MATTER OF COMPOSITION OF GENERAL COMMITTEE AT 31ST UNGA. NEW ZEALAND AND UK EMPHASIZED THAT, GIVEN THEIR SUPPORT OF LIBERAL INSCRIPTION OF AGENDA ITEMS, THEY COULD NOT SUPPORT MOVE FOR DELETION OF HOSTIL ITEM ON KOREA BY GENERAL COMMITTEE. ROK REPLIED THAT, MOST IMPORTANTLY, AWARENESS OF LIKELY COMPOSITION OF GENERAL COMMITTEE COULD BE KEY FACTOR IN DECIDING FOR OR AGAINST INSCRIPTION OF FRIENDLY ITEM. CORE GROUP THEN AGREED TO EXCHANGE NOTES REGULARLY ON COMPOSITION OF GENERAL COMMITTEE. BASED ON FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION AVAILABLE THIS CONFIDENTIAL

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EARLY DATE, FOLLOWING EMERGED REGARDING COMPOSITION OF 25-MEMBER GENERAL COMMITTEE:

(A) PRESIDENT OF UNGA -- SRI LANKA

(B) CHAIRMEN OF MAIN COMMITTEES: I -- POLAND; SPECIAL POLITICAL -- LATIN AMERICAN?; II - AFRICAN?; III - FRG ENDORSED; IV - ?; V - ?; VI - AUSTRIA AND FINLAND.

(C) VICE PRESIDENTS OF UNGA: US, UK, FRANCE, USSR, CHINA PLUS AFRICAN GROUP 4 (SUDAN); LATIN AMERICAN GROUP 3 (NICARAGUA); ASIA 2 (JAPAN, OMAN, DEMOCRATIC YEMEN); WESTERN EUROPE AND OTHERS 2 (AUSTRALIA, DENMARK, FINLAND, TURKEY); AND EASTERN EUROPE 1.

7. CORE GROUP AGREED TO MEET NEXT ON MAY 5 AT 10:00AM. AGENDA WOULD BE TO START CONSIDERATION OF OPTIONS FOR ACTION IN ORDER LISTED IN PARA 1 ABOVE. ADDITIONALLY, CORE GROUP WOULD DISCUSS NEW YORK LOBBYING ASSIGNMENTS OF NONALIGNED AS DISCUSSED PARA 4 ABOVE. (EC-9 CORE GROUP MEMBERS KEEPING OTHER MEMBERS OF EC-9 INFORMED, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO FRENCH.)

8. LOBBYING MATERIAL:

(A) CANADA PROVIDED FOLLOWING LOBBYING MATERIAL FROM OTTAWA:  
"ACCORDING TO OUR FILES BOTH DPRK/USSR AND DPRK/PRC MILITARY  
ASSISTANCE TREATIES (OFFICIALLY QUOTE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP,  
COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE) WHICH WERE  
SIGNED JUNE AND JULY 1961 RESPECTIVELY ARE VALID FOR TEN YEARS  
PLUS FIVE IF NOT RPT NOT ABROGATED AT END OF FULL TERM.  
THIS MAY MEAN THAT TREATY WILL BE RENEWED DURING EXPECTED  
SUMMER VISIT KIM I SUNG TO MOSCOW. CORE GROUP MAY WISH TO  
CONSIDER WHETHER AND HOW REAFFIRMATION OF USSR/DPRK (AND  
POSSIBLY PRC/DPRK) MILITARY LINK OR PROSPECT OF SAME  
COULD, AT APPROPRIATE TIME, BE USED BY CORE GROUP LOBBYISTS.  
OF FURTHER INTEREST, TEXT OF USSR/DPRK JOINT COMMUNIQUE, WHICH  
WAS ANNOUNCED JULY 10, 1961, STATED QUOTE BOTH SOVIET UNION  
AND NORTH KOREA HELD THAT PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA IS  
ABOVE ALL MATTER FOR KOREAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES, AND SOLUTION  
OF GENERAL KOREAN PROBLEMS IS ONLY POSSIBLE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS  
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BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA. END QUOTE"

(B) CORE GROUP ASKED IF US MIGHT BE ABLE TO ASSEMBLY LOBBYING  
MATERIAL REGARDING WORLD-WIDE PRESENCE OF TROOPS IN COUNTRIES  
OTHER THAN THEIR OWN. CORE GROUP THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL  
AGAINST NORTH KOREAN CAMPAIGN ABOUT FOREIGN TROOPS IN ROK.  
COULD WASHINGTON PREPARE THIS?  
SCRANTON

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## Message Attributes

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OTTAWA



SAN JOSE  
SEOUL  
TOKYO  
WELLINGTON

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